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I. THE OCCASION FOR THIS ESSAY
This essay is a meditation on fair housing to pay tribute1 to
Professor Daniel R. Mandelker for his sustained contribution to the
field of housing and community development law and policy. For
more than fifty years he has labored with powerful intellect, keen
insight, great skill, and enormous energy. He has been a remarkably
productive scholar and a true leader by his shining example to the
many who share his scholarly and teaching interests in the housing
field and related areas.
For twenty years, I have had the good fortune and honor of
working with Dan on developing a coursebook for housing and
community development.2 His contribution to that work was the key
ingredient in getting the first edition published. He was the
inspiration behind the second edition of that coursebook,3 as well as
its current third edition.4
Dan was not only a key person in formulating the execution of the
book, but he was also instrumental in assembling the cadre of
colleagues5 to produce each edition. Our esteem for Dan is expressed
by the fact that his co-authors dedicated the third edition of the book
to him with the following statement:
We proudly dedicate this Third Edition of HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT to our Senior Editor Emeritus,
esteemed colleague, and friend Daniel R. Mandelker, Howard
1. It goes without saying that the views expressed in this essay are my own, although as
expressed later in this essay, I credit Professor Mandelker’s analysis for causing me to think
deeply about the larger issues at stake in the fair housing and exclusionary zoning area.
2. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1st ed.
1981).
3. CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1989).
4. CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1999).
5. In addition to this writer, Professor Mandelker’s co-authors on the Third Edition of the
Housing and Community Development coursebook are Otto J. Hetzel, Professor Emeritus,
Wayne State University School of Law; James A. Kushner, Professor, Southwestern University
School of Law; Henry W. McGee, Jr., Professor, Seattle University School of Law and
Professor Emeritus UCLA School of Law; Robert M. Washburn, Professor, Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey School of Law, Camden; Peter W. Salsich, Jr., McDonnell Professor
of Justice in American Society, Saint Louis University School of Law; and W. Dennis Keating,
Professor, Cleveland State University Cleveland-Marshall School of Law and College of Urban
Affairs.
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A. Stamper Professor, Washington University School of Law.
His deep interest in the subject, extraordinary professional
dedication, and outstanding scholarship have influenced all of
us. He has inspired us as a role model and has served as our
mentor.6
II. “FAIR” HOUSING: THE SEARCH FOR AN ANALYTICAL PARADIGM
As lamented by the Kerner Commission in 1968,7 and as
documented in so many places, America is a nation characterized by
segregated housing and living patterns.8 The extent to which the
problem is racially determined or reflects the correlation of deprived
economic and minority status confounds analysis.9 Whatever the
analysis, the fact that there are deep racial divisions in living patterns
in America cannot be denied.
It is profoundly noteworthy that segregated housing patterns have
persisted, or in some respects become more pervasive and
intractable,10 despite the enactment of fair housing legislation.11 The
difficulties might be attributable to the feebleness of our
Constitutional analysis,12 the limitations of our statutory
formulations, or the inadequacy of our remedial tools to accomplish
housing desegregation.13 It might be attributable to the way courts
have approached the analysis of the problem in private litigation,14 or
to the private litigation model itself as the primary means of
6. CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL. HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1999).
7. REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Bantam Books
1968). See also Symposium— The Urban Crisis: The Kerner Commission Report Revisited, 71
N.C. L. REV. 1283 (1993).
8. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID
(1993).
9. See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle
Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 969 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, An Individual Preference Approach to Suburban Racial
Desegregation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533 (1999).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (West 1999).
12. This matter is discussed further infra.
13. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-711 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 16 (1988).
14. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976).
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enforcement.15 It might be the lack of vigorous governmental
enforcement.16 Perhaps this phenomenon says something about the
robustness of forces that deny desegregation of housing or about our
half-hearted enforcement efforts and sagging energies for social
justice. Perhaps it says something more or something else altogether.
Maybe the phenomenon says that we, individually and collectively,
do not really want to dismantle racially distinct residential living
patterns. Whatever the reason, we know at least this: we have not
even come close to dismantling segregated housing patterns for most
Americans, and the prospect that we shall do so as a nation is not
terribly encouraging.17
We, as a society, have not clarified either the immediate or the
long-term problem. I have come to see many explanations for the
observed phenomenon as focusing on symptoms of the deeper
underlying reasons, rather than focusing on the underlying reasons
themselves.
A. The Problem of Deciding What the Problem Is
A virtually unknown federal district court case, Coffey v.
Romney,18 decided nearly thirty years ago still raises one of the most
fundamental questions of “fair” housing. This case ostensibly
involved an “integrated” set of plaintiffs suing a “white” corporate
developer of a low-income housing development (Trinity Gardens),
designed to be “integrated,” assisted with federal subsidies, and
15. See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share
Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1573, 1580-90 (1993). See also,
Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable Remedies
to Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 909 (1991).
16. See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of
Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998) (discussing limited governmental
enforcement and pointing out that private litigation might achieve better results for clients, at
least with larger damage awards in some types of cases).
17. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation:
“Hewing a Stone of Hope From a Mountain of Despair,” 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (1995);
Timothy L. Thompson, Promoting Mobility and Equal Opportunity: Hollman v. Cisneros, 5 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 237 (1996).
18. Coffey v. Romney, 1P-H Equal Opportunity in Hous. Rep. ¶ 13,588 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
My knowledge of this case and my interest in it are heightened by the fact that, as a young
lawyer, I was an associate with the firm that represented the company that was to be the
developer and the builder of the housing development that was the subject of the litigation.
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sponsored by a “black” church in a Southern city. At one level, the
case raised the legal question of whether the federal government
should fund a housing development if that development allegedly
would cause or accelerate “racial transition.”
At another level exactly what sort of analysis the proposal for
Trinity Gardens should get, depended.19 What the affected area was
“depended.” The characteristics of the racial demographics to be
analyzed “depended.” What sort of area would be subject to alleged
racial transition the development would cause if built “depended.”
The answers to these questions quite literally “depended” on where
one drew a circle around the proposed Trinity Gardens development.
If one drew a circle about one quarter of a mile in diameter around
the development, the area could be regarded as a “white area,” and no
problem of over-concentration of minorities or assisted housing
would be raised. If one drew a circle about one mile in diameter
around the development, the area could be considered an “integrated
area,” which might give a different view of the potential consequence
of building Trinity Gardens. If one drew a three mile long, one mile
in diameter, somewhat oblong enclosure southward from the
proposed site, the area would include the southeast quadrant of the
city— a virtually all black quadrant containing about ninety percent of
the blacks in the city and a high concentration of federally-assisted
housing. This oblong enclosure would also include a portion of the
northeast quadrant of the city. The challenged development would be
located within a “white enclave” located within the northeast
quadrant, giving the issues and their resolution still a different cast.
Finally, if one encircled the entire city, one would see a substantially
racially divided city where one quadrant— the northwest— had
exclusionary zoning, was characterized by the court as ninety-nine
percent white,20 and had no low-income federally-assisted housing,
again transforming the issues in the case.
The court decided that federal funding of the housing
development should not be stopped and that the officials of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development properly determined
19. The court discussed what the relevant area was but did not use the term “depended,”
which is my characterization. See id. at 13,867-72.
20. Id. at 13,869.
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that the area in which the development was located was a “white
area.”21 The court also decided that the development would not cause
or accelerate racial transition and that it did not amount to an over-
concentration in the area of multifamily housing for low- and
moderate-income families.
The answer the district court gave was wrong on the facts, focused
on the wrong law and policy paradigm, and did not address (and
could not address) the fundamental problem that the case should have
raised, but did not raise.22 Yet, the decision was right on the narrow
legal issue presented and addressed. Paradoxically, I think the court
was arguably right on the outcome of the case in the posture
presented, for reasons other than those articulated. But, if the case
could have been presented in a properly developed posture, I am
fairly convinced the case was ultimately wrong from the standpoint
of national “fair” housing policy.
At a deeper level, the case raised quite perplexing issues. Now,
nearly thirty years later, I have come to believe that the
contemporaneous manifestation of the same question that perplexed
me as a young lawyer working on the Coffey case is at the root of
issues that today are still perplexing American society. I also have
come to believe that the “true,” “right,” or “real” fair housing issue
was never actually raised in the case and, of course, was not decided
or discussed.
One can ask about the Coffey case, what was the fair housing
problem? This is the question. Coffey can be seen as the mirror from
which we can see reflected the question of what is the purpose, or are
the purposes, of the nation’s fair housing laws and efforts.23 This is a
21. Id. at 13,866, 13,872.
22. I guess, ethically, I can say this but I should disclose that I worked for the law firm
that represented the developer seeking to build the housing development for the church sponsor.
I think it is not disloyal to say that I think our client should have won the case based on the
context in which it was presented, but after nearly thirty years of reflection, I do not think the
case raised the right questions or addressed the fundamental issues.
23. The issue mainly focuses on what is the purpose of the fair housing provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (popularly called “Title VIII,” or the “Fair Housing Act”) 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3601-3619, 3631 (West 1999). However, the issue, at least in some manifestations, can be
raised under Section 1982. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (West 1999). Issues can also be raised under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
See discussion infra of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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question that America has not answered. Conversely, those who do
purport to answer the question cannot agree what the right answer is
or ought to be.
A highly noticed case, United States v. Starrett City Assoc.,24
seems to raise the same perplexing issues as Coffey. Ostensibly, the
legal issue in Starrett City was whether the operator of a housing
development could engage in “integration maintenance” by limiting
the percentage of black and minority residents in the development to
numbers low enough25 so as not to trigger “flight” by white residents
of the development, with the consequence that the development
would lose its “integrated” character.
The circuit court decided that the conduct of the operator violated
the Fair Housing Act.26 Title VIII, the court said, prohibited the
defendant from setting ceiling quotas of indefinite duration on the
black and other minorities seeking housing at Starrett City.27 The
court said the quota “made unavailable” housing on the basis of race
when the maximum number of minorities permitted under the quota
was reached.28 It did not matter that the purpose of the quota was to
maintain integration rather than to exclude all minorities.
This case should be troublesome if for no other reason than that
the United States Department of Justice was suing the Starrett City
development. This was a Justice Department lead by officials of the
Reagan Administration— Edwin Meese as Attorney General and
William Bradford Reynolds as Assistant Attorney General and head
of the Civil Rights Division. These were not officials whose policy
positions demonstrated that they were friends of the minority
community or advocates for the minority position on any number of
issues being advanced by blacks and minorities.29 This was a case of
24. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988).
25. What this number should be was a matter of contention. See id. at 1099.
26. Id. at 1103.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1102.
29. See, e.g., Robert G. Schwemm, The Future of Fair Housing Litigation, 26 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 745, 763 (1993) (“Prior to enactment of the FHAA in 1988, the federal
government played only a modest role in fair housing enforcement. This was partly due to the
limitations on that role written into Title VIII and partly due to political considerations during
the Reagan Administration, which all but abandoned even the limited fair housing efforts of
prior administrations.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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“strange bedfellows” and it was about politics— in the sense that the
Department of Justice was advancing a political agenda,30 not
befriending the downtrodden or taking up the cause of minorities
fighting against racist housing policies.
More troublesome, the case was not presented in a posture that
would allow it to raise the “right,” “real,” or “true” issue of fair
housing policy. It was decided a-contextually, as an isolated, stand-
alone problem. The case was treated as if the Starrett City
development somehow existed on an island without being affected by
the geographic, demographic, social, or economic environment
around it and without reference to any issues as to why there might
be “disproportionate demand” from minorities for housing in the
particular Starrett City development.
While it is impossible for me to conclude that the conduct
challenged did not seem on its face to be prohibited by the Fair
Housing Act, I have found it equally impossible to be satisfied with
the rationale of the case or its limitations. Yet, again paradoxically, I
must concede that the next minority person who applied after the
quota was reached would be denied something important and,
probably, that such denial ought to be prohibited by law. This is a
dilemma seeking a way to reconciliation.
The same dilemma, or critical aspects of it, can be observed in the
Arlington Heights31 case in which the plaintiffs raised constitutional
issues. In Arlington Heights a housing developer and minority
plaintiffs sued a virtually all-white municipality alleging that the
municipality’s refusal to rezone a tract of land from single family to a
multifamily classification to permit the building of a federally-
subsidized housing development (Lincoln Green) violated the Equal
Protection Clause.32 The claim was that the refusal to rezone
excluded a federally-subsidized housing development for which only
30. As Civil Rights Division head William Bradford Reynolds testified in 1981:
We no longer will insist upon or in any respect support the use of quotas or any other
numerical or statistical formula designed to provide to nonvictims of discrimination
preferential treatment.
Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 TEX. L. REV. 353, 355 (1989).
31. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
32. Id. at 557.
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low- and moderate-income persons qualified. This claim was
premised on a projection that Lincoln Green would have an
integrated occupancy. Minorities comprised a higher proportion of
the persons eligible to live in the development than they comprised
either within the municipality33 or within the relevant housing market
area.34 Thus, the refusal to re-zone had a greater impact on minorities
than on whites and, therefore, the plaintiffs contended, violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
The United States Supreme Court decided that Arlington Height’s
exclusionary zoning did not violate the Constitution because it was
not shown to have been undertaken with a racial animus against the
black and other minorities who would be excluded from the
municipality if Lincoln Green could not be built.35 The key area of
focus was not on whether the zoning in fact excluded minorities but
rather on whether, regardless of the fact of exclusion, it could be
shown that the municipality adopted the ordinance with a probable
intent or purpose to exclude minorities. The plaintiffs did not, and
presumably could not, show this kind of intent.
Of course, Arlington Heights, brought under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution, differed in its analytical methodology
from the analysis in Coffey and Starrett City, which were based on
the Fair Housing Act. The constitutional methodology limited the
analysis to the framework the Court employed for such cases.
Nevertheless, once the Court gave uncritical acceptance to the
Village’s asserted commitment to single family land uses, the
outcome of the case was, for all practical purposes, determined
against any successful challenge to the refusal to re-zone. In this
respect, as discussed later, the Court was examining the case from too
cramped of a perspective to address the “right,” “real,” or “true” issue
of “fair” housing policy that the case raised.
33. Arlington’s population was 64,000, but only 27 of the Village’s residents were black.
34. Minorities constituted 18% of the Chicago area population, and 40% of the income
groups eligible to reside in Lincoln Green.
35. 429 U.S. at 27.
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B. Contexts Matter When Trying to Figure Out What the Question Is
As all analysts know litigation does not come neatly packaged to
frame the “right,” “real,” or “true” issue of fair housing policy that a
case might raise. Rather, the ultimate contours of a case are
determined by the facts that can be proved, the strategic choices
advocates make, the interests and objectives of the litigants, the
resources litigants and their lawyers bring to the battle, the provisions
of relevant applicable law, the limitations imposed by the judicial
process, the judge hearing the case, and a host of other matters, some
of which, assuredly, are attributable to serendipity.
Nevertheless, the contexts out of which the issues being litigated
arise can have a bearing on the “right,” “real,” or “true” issue of fair
housing policy that needs to be addressed in a case. In the three cases
selected, neither case addresses the issues in context and, therefore,
each missed something important about fair housing policy.
Recall that the size of the circle drawn around the proposed
development in Coffey materially affected the issues of the case. The
court decided that the development could go forward because it was
located in a “white area” and would not cause or accelerate racial
transition in that area. Within months the predicted racial transition
happened and the entire area around the development became all
black.36
The problem was that Coffey never focused on the big picture.
The city was clearly excluding low- and moderate-income housing
from the northwest quadrant of the city, but had rezoned the proposed
northeast site to permit the building of Trinity Gardens over the
protests of some of the plaintiffs. The northwest quadrant, according
to the court, was ninety-nine percent white.37 The southeast, by
contrast, had a high concentration of federally-assisted housing for
low- and moderate-income families. The area under litigation in the
northeast quadrant was very much susceptible to racial transition. The
court mentions that a question might be raised as to whether there
were “suitable alternative sites” elsewhere in the city upon which the
36. See Daye, supra note 4, at 578-79.
37. Coffey, supra note 18, at 13,869.
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development might be built.38 But, in the posture of the case, there
was not an occasion or procedure for taking a city-wide view of the
housing demographics. There was not an occasion to examine why
there were pressures on the northeast quadrant that made it attractive
to blacks seeking to move there. There was not an occasion to
consider racial steering in the real estate market or the exclusion of
minorities from other areas within the housing market area. There
was not an occasion to examine alternatives that the federal
government might consider other than either approving or rejecting
the housing on the site proposed. These limitations pitted housing
need against fair housing policy.39
It is not as though that these issues were somehow completely
missed. On the contrary, the litigants, the sponsor, the lawyers, and
the court were all aware of the limited perspective the case was
taking. The church sponsors unabashedly placed a higher priority on
housing needs than on residential integration. At a community
meeting attended by the author, the view that there was a manifest
need for this affordable housing was clearly expressed. If the whites
in the area of the project moved out, that might be unfortunate, but
the housing need was the paramount interest of the members of the
sponsoring black church.
The experts involved in the litigation believed the transition would
happen, and Dr. Karl E. Taeuber40 so testified for the plaintiffs. The
lawyers were just trying to either let the project go forward or to stop
it. The judge was aware that the court’s scope of the inquiry was
limited by the issue as framed by the litigants. The court noted in
rejecting the plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions that racial transition
would be accelerated that the expert did not have to balance the need
for housing against his prediction that Trinity Gardens, if built, would
38. Id. at 13,864.
39. See John O. Calmore, Fair Housing v. Fair Housing: The Problems with Providing
Increased Housing Opportunities through Spatial Deconcentration, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7
(1980).
40. The court misspelled Dr. Taeuber’s name. At the time of the litigation he had recently
authored a book on the question of racial change of neighborhoods and was qualified in the case
an expert on segregation and neighborhood change. See KARL E. TAEUBER & ALMA F.
TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES: RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE
(1965).
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cause racial transition.41 In other words the court recognized that
housing and fair housing might be in opposition. The court also
recognized that federally-assisted housing in the city was
predominantly occupied by blacks. The court, however, had no
occasion to examine why that might be so. Was it due to
“discrimination” in the housing market? Was it due to a lack of
economic resources? Why should that produce a disproportionate
number of minorities? Nobody in the case had a commission to open
up the northwest quadrant to subsidized housing or to challenge the
exclusionary zoning that was clearly evidenced there.
The Starrett City case has limitations similar to those pointed out
in the Coffey case. Professor Simon, in his article, pointed out the
extent to which Starrett City omits the context that would enable one
to get a clear focus on the fair housing policy issues at stake.42
Aspects of this context particularly pertinent to this discussion, as
posed by Professor Simon, include the following: The limited rental
opportunities for blacks and minorities in the housing market area,
federal conditions on assistance that required Starrett City to rent to a
substantial number of very low-income families, the lack of a
realistic prospect for locating housing projects in the suburbs that
would be occupied by substantial numbers of minorities, and the
pressures from whites in the area in which Starrett City was being
built to limit the number of minorities in the development.43 These
factors placed two clashing pressures on the developers of Starrett
City: one from opponents of the project, who claimed that the number
of minorities should not become “too great,” and a second from
minorities wanting to live in Starrett City because of excessive
demand caused by disproportionate housing need.44
In this sense the first pressure could be seen as having been
generated by racism, seeking to deny minorities both needed housing
41. Coffey, supra note 18, at 13,872.
42. Thomas W. Simon, Double Reverse Discrimination in Housing: Contextualizing the
Starrett City Case, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 803 (1991).
43. Id. at 818.
44. See Neil Shouse, The Bifurcation: Class Polarization and Housing Segregation in the
Twenty-First Century Metropolis, 30 URB. LAW. 145, 183 (1998) (an allegorical extrapolation
pointing out demand for units by poor blacks and Hispanics exceeded the demand of the middle
class).
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and fair housing. A reasonable person can see a strong argument that
such pressures should not be allowed to coerce the developer into
imposing ceiling quotas on minority occupancy. Arguably, however,
specific pressure to limit minority occupancy is the lesser of the evils
presented. The second pressure was the minorities’ need-driven
demand for units like those in Starrett City. That pressure was created
by two conditions. The first condition was the insufficiency of
affordable housing in the housing market area. The other was the
over-representation of minorities among the lower-income families
seeking housing in Starrett City. It does not require prescience to
suppose that “excess” minority demand for housing at Starrett City
and the over-representation of minorities in the eligible group might
have something to do with discrimination in the housing market and a
racially-correlated lack of economic opportunity.
It goes without saying that the Starrett City court could not
conceivably address these mammoth concerns in one piece of
litigation. I will make no suggestion here that we modify either the
judicial process or the limitations of substance or procedure to allow
the judiciary to effect a cure.45 Yet, on certain days, I come to the
firm conclusion that Starrett City was extremely wrong as a matter of
national fair housing policy. It permitted the destruction of the very
opportunity for Americans of different races to work together in a
housing environment that the Starrett City development was
apparently offering.46 On other days, I come to the firm conclusion
that blacks and other minorities should not be asked to sacrifice their
need for housing at the alter of fair housing, by being turned away
when badly needed housing is available on the ground that, because
of their race, they are diminishing the integration of the development.
Professor Mandelker pointed out similar limitations affecting the
Arlington Heights case.47 He pointed out that the Supreme Court in
Arlington Heights “has foreclosed a finding of racially discriminatory
45. I have made some modest suggestions in the past. See Charles E. Daye, Role of the
Judiciary in Housing and Community Development, 52 J. OF URB. L. 689 (1975).
46. I have not seen an analysis of the degree to which there was interaction among the
races.
47. Daniel R. Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective
on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1217 (1977).
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intent in all but the most blatant cases.”48 His analysis demonstrated
that such a limited basis for scrutinizing exclusionary zoning would
permit “equally damaging zoning actions that lie just over the line of
provable intent.”49 Professor Mandelker’s point about “equally
damaging zoning actions” takes a broader view of zoning conduct
than whether it met some narrow, cramped test of “zoning factors.”50
The damaging action might be seen as either causing or continuing
segregation within the community, or denying housing opportunity in
the community to those in need of federally-subsidized housing. The
Court’s decision, however, makes no provision for analysis of this
fair housing policy perspective.
Professor Mandelker advocates: “An appraisal of the acceptability
of municipal zoning in a broader context is required, and necessarily
must survey the entire region containing the municipality.”51 While
he recognized that a regional perspective from a broad fair housing
policy perspective, rather than a too-limited zoning consistency
perspective, would require a more activist judicial role, he doubted
the courts were the right forum for doing so, at least not without more
explicit statutory guidance from Congress.
C. The Policy Question Coffey, Starrett City, and Arlington Heights
Have in Common: “What is America’s Fair Housing Policy?”
If one can get the question right either as a matter of a litigation
issue or more broadly as a matter of a national fair housing policy
issue, then this is just the first step toward solving the dilemma by the
cases discussed. One must then move from the question to the
answer— one must determine what substance the fair housing policy
mandates. One will encounter a serious problem here. America has
simply not decided the contents of her fundamental fair housing
policy.
48. Id. at 1239.
49. Id. at 1244.
50. Id. at 1238-39.
51. Id. at 1246.
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1. Models of Fair Housing Perspectives
Many commentators have pointed out that the Fair Housing Act is
unclear as to what legislative objective Congress was seeking to
obtain with the Act.52 It is unclear in part because of the sparseness of
the legislative history,53 the hastiness of its enactment following the
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, and the other contentious
issues the Congress believed the Act presented.54
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 did not materially
address the fundamental issues, but rather was concerned with trying
to shore up certain procedural and enforcement weaknesses of the
Act.55 It did not clarify in any way the fundamental policy behind the
Act.
As a society we have no answer to the question: “What is
America’s fundamental fair housing policy?” There are, however,
various perspectives as to what it could be. Most of the analyses are
premised on what I shall call the “conflict” model of fair housing
policy. This model sees a predominant or major purpose and posits
different directly conflicting goals. For example, the most prevalent
conflict cited appears to pit a non-discrimination purpose against an
integration goal.56 Another model might arrange goals lexically, with
52. See, e.g., Terenia Urban Guill, Environmental Justice Suits Under the Fair Housing
Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (1998).
53. See, e.g., Lisa J. Laplace, Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas: Fair
Housing or Forced Housing, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 197 (1989) (adopting the antidiscrimination
paradigm).
54. See, e.g., Jerald J. Director, What Constitutes “Pattern or Practice” of Racial
Discrimination in Sale or Rental of Housing Within Meaning of Provision of Fair Housing Act
of 1968 (42 U.S.C.A. § 3613) Authorizing Attorney General to Bring Civil Action for Preventive
Relief Against Such Conduct, 13 A.L.R. Fed. 285, 291 n.8 (1972).
55. See H.R. Rep. 100-711, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 16 (1988). See, e.g., James A. Kushner,
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1049 (1989); James A. Kushner, Federal Enforcement and Judicial Review of
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 3 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 537 (1992).
56. See Christopher C. Ehrman, Integration versus Antidiscrimination, 24 MEMPHIS ST.
U. L. REV. 33 (1993); Peter Engel, The Reading Room: Antidiscrimination is to Integration as
Black is to White, 5 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV. L. 203 (1996); Ankur
Goel, Restricting Minority Occupancy to Maintain Housing Integration— United States v.
Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 376 (1988);
Laplace, supra note 53, at 247-48 (adopting the antidiscrimination paradigm). But see Marc A.
Kushner, Note, The Legality of Race-Conscious Access Quotas under the Fair Housing Act of
1968, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1053 (1988) (supporting the desegregation paradigm).
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higher goals taking precedence over the goals in priority.57 One
colleague has proposed multiple, and apparently complimentary,
purposes for the Fair Housing Act.58
It appears that one could construct a series of five pairs of basic
policy choices. The first model is the usually cited focus that
contrasts a nondiscrimination policy with a desegregation (or an
integration) focus.59 The second model posits an individual rights
perspective versus a group fairness perspective.60 The third policy
focus is a perspective that presents a process versus an outcome
analysis.61 The fourth perspective looks at a means analysis versus an
ends analysis.62 The fifth perspective sets out a micro analysis versus
57. I have not found a specific fair housing proposal that actually would do that. The
principle would require the ordering of values and the satisfaction of the highest value before
moving to the next value in the order. This principle is frequently associated with John Rawls,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42-43 (1971). See Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare
State and Theories of Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1976).
58. James A. Kushner, A Comparative Vision of the Convergence of Ecology,
Empowerment, and the Quest for a Just Society, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 931 (1998)
59. Nondiscrimination versus Integration: A nondiscrimination policy would favor the
abolition of treatment of persons on a basis according to racial (or other characteristic)
distinctions. Integration, on the other hand, seeks to incorporate all distinctive people into one
group. See Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 332, 608 (10th ed. 1993). For a concise explanation
on how the Fair Housing Act seeks to satisfy both of these goals, see Florence Wagman
Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program and the Civil
Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011 n.82 (1998). For a critique of the integration policy
goal, see Marc A. Kushner, The Legality of Race-Conscious Access Quotas Under the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1053, 1077-79 (1988).
60. Individual Rights versus Group Fairness: An individual rights policy would focus on
specific rights on a case-by-case situation for a single person. A group fairness perspective
looks at the greater good in terms of many individuals as a unit. For a discussion on individual
rights versus group fairness in mandatory class actions, see Patricia Anne Solomon, Are
Mandatory Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1627, 1629, 1644-46
(1997). See also Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Deeper Into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political
Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1560-64 (1994).
61. Process versus Outcomes: A policy detailing a process analysis is concerned with
initiation and developing sequence of a situation that moves to an end result. The outcomes
analysis looks at the end result itself. See generally Michelle Hyland, Book Review, The
Multiple Realities of International Mediation: By Marieke Kleiboer, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. &
POL. 942 (1999); Diane Meulemans, Approaching the Slope: Processes and Outcomes of the
Use of Slippery Slope in Legal Opinions, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 105 (1999).
62. Means Analysis versus Ends Analysis: Much like the process versus outcomes
distinction, the means analysis and ends analysis focuses on the progression of a circumstance
and how the circumstance is resolved. For a discussion on the means and ends in a due process
context, see Glen E. Summers, Comment, Private Property Without Lochner: Toward a
Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted By substantive Due Process, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 837 n.90
(1993); Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the
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a macro analysis.63 No set of comparative models is necessarily
discrete, but each tends to highlight a point of emphasis as to the
basic policy choice.
In some respects elements of these pairs overlap in various ways;
some of the items can be seen as policy “correlates.” For example,
the non-discrimination focus and the individual rights perspective
tend to see remedying the harm to the immediate individual as the
primary objective of fair housing policy and law. This perspective
devolves into a micro view of fair housing policy where the point of
focus is on the atomistic or building block level— the smallest
component upon which we might focus.
The process and means perspectives correlate to the extent that
both look toward the input side of the fair housing policy equation,
rather than the output side. Both the process and means perspectives
focus on the “manner of” or “how” a thing was done rather than on
the consequences that attended the process or means.64
Conversely, a broader focus on “desegregation” (or “integration”)
overlaps group fairness because the concept of segregation is hard to
contemplate at the individual level. This is not to say the such
segregation cannot exist–witness the example in which one black
family in a neighborhood or apartment complex might be isolated and
“segregated” from interactions with white neighbors. The conduct,
however, takes on broad social meaning and societal significance
when substantial numbers of individuals are affected. In that sense
segregation and desegregation or integration are inherently group-
oriented concepts.
At the level of national fair housing policy, one would expect
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 365-70, 390, 414-15 (1999).
63. Micro Analysis versus Macro Analysis: A micro analysis focuses on variations on a
small scale, whereas a macro analysis focuses on large-scale proportions. In essence, it is
looking at the small picture, versus looking at the big picture, much like the perspective dealing
with individual rights versus group fairness. See WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 697,
734 (10th ed. 1993). For a detailed discussion of this perspective in both the economics
discipline, as well as a legal discipline, see WAYNE C. CURTIS, MICROECONOMIC CONCEPTS
FOR ATTORNEYS 4-5 (1984). See generally TERENCE HUTCHISON, THE LIMITATIONS OF
GENERAL THEORIES IN MACROECONOMICS 3-8 (1980).
64. Here is a clear parallel to the due process analysis and an equal protection analysis: A
due process analysis asks “Can they do that to me like that?” Equal protection asks “Can they
do that to me at all?”
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desegregation to produce some measure of integration. This is true
whether the outcome is expected to be mixing, or the more practical
reason that, absent some degree of mixing, one would have no way to
know whether a desegregation policy was being achieved or was
effective. This type of “outcomes” perspective, either as the goal
itself or as a measuring device for goal achievement, must necessarily
focus on ends. It must, as to national policy, focus on ends from a
macro— large scale, broader, or even societal— perspective.
A “non-discrimination” policy applied at the micro level can be
opposed to the integration model. Starrett City can be seen as an
example of such a conflict. Perhaps achieving, but certainly
maintaining, integration in the development was found to be in
conflict with a non-discrimination analytical paradigm.65 It is not
clear whether the opposition was that direct. It may be that there was
something wrong with the process that Starrett City used. For
example, they may have lied to applicants about the availability of
units, or there may have been something wrong with the means
Starrett City was employing to maintain integration— for example,
placing a ceiling quota on the number of minorities allowed into the
development at the same time. Similarly, the Starrett City case placed
primacy on the right of the individual to be free from
“discrimination” at the micro level when seeking housing in the
Starrett City development.
Earlier, citing Professor Simon, I pointed out that a broader
perspective might well have asked whether some kind of
discrimination was leading to the excess demand by minorities at
Starrett City.66 This suggests that one could analyze discrimination at
the macro level, at some level broader than the Starrett City complex
itself, or even at a societal level. One might then see that the fair
housing policy that needed addressing was not within the Starrett City
development but elsewhere. Moreover, one might also see that
remedying the narrower problem at the Starrett City micro level,
viewed from any perspective of national fair housing policy, was next
65. The Starrett City decision distinguished Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484
F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973), as involving achievment of integration at initial occupancy from the
Starrett City situation of long-term maintenance of specified levels of integration.
66. See supra note 43.
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to no remedy at all. It did nothing to relieve the pressures on Starrett
City by minorities suffering from a lack of opportunity in housing
elsewhere, economics, or both. Additionally, it frustrated the chance
for integration in that housing development.
Attempting to remedy either the housing needs problem or the fair
housing problem at the micro level at the insistence of the private
litigants in the Arlington Heights case, perhaps, would have made the
proposed units available. This remedy would have had no significant
impact on the lack of opportunity that produced the disproportionate
need minorities had for the proposed subsidized housing. Even if the
case had gone the other way, it is doubtful that it would have done
much to open up other suburbs. The ability to find adequate sites,
sufficient federal or other funding, willing sellers, prepared
developers, lawyers to advocate, and litigants to pursue cases would
all probably mean that the volume of potential litigation would be
small and, therefore, the in terrorem effect of possible lawsuits as a
restraint on exclusionary zoning would likely be de minimis. Pursuit
of a fair housing policy devoted to a non-discrimination goal in the
context of fair housing and exclusionary zoning would likely not
further much in the way of integration in housing patterns.
Vindicating the rights of those individual litigants who filed lawsuits
would probably not be much of a deterrent to exclusionary zoning
elsewhere, and would not create much, if any, incentive in other
municipalities to stop engaging in exclusionary zoning.
What is clear is that we would need a macro focus on the larger
societal goal of desegregation to really think right about the Arlington
Heights litigation from a national fair housing policy perspective. We
would have to think about desegregating all of the Arlingtons in
America. That would lead to a group focus on distinct policy and
substantive housing outcomes as goals or ends. We would enumerate
those ends as aspects of fairness to members of groups in need of
housing or consigned to segregated housing in housing market areas.
This appears to be the clear import of Professor Mandelker’s critique
of Arlington Heights. “Moral outrage at the indecency of racially
exclusionary zoning practices, especially when viewed against the
continuing pattern of racial segregation existing in metropolitan
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areas, argues strongly for a more activist judicial role.”67 However, he
doubted that the courts could undertake this new role, at least not
without substantial legislative guidance. He pointed out that:
To do more would require a different judicial perspective, one
that would necessarily require an evaluation of municipal
zoning from a regional perspective. This task is one that the
federal courts, operating solely with the purpose of correcting
racially correlated impacts in the local zoning process, are ill-
equipped to undertake absent more explicit congressional
guidance.68
The Coffey case raises the same type of issues, only in reverse, or
possibly scaled down to within a municipality. The plaintiffs needed
to challenge the building of Trinity Gardens because the zoning
permitted it to go forward on the site in question. The plaintiffs
fought the construction as a matter of their individual rights to be free
of racial transition caused or increased by action of the federal
government. This individual focus was broader than that in Starrett
City where the proposition declared that minorities had a right to a
unit in Starrett City unencumbered by racial quotas, even if it caused
segregation. Conversely, the Coffey plaintiffs’ individual focus was
narrower than that in Arlington Heights in which is was asserted that
minorities had a right to live in Arlington unencumbered by
exclusionary zoning that made suburban housing unavailable to a
disproportionate number of minority families who were eligible for
federal housing subsidies. However, it should be noted that Coffey
still had an individual, nondiscrimination focus.
Although the plaintiffs, to some extent, had an outcome
perspective, the process issues in Coffey focused on whether HUD
had used the correct method for approving Trinity Gardens. The
plaintiff’s argued that if HUD had used the correct process and
criteria it would have refused to fund Trinity Gardens. However, the
court took a micro perspective on the issue and drew a small circle
around Trinity Gardens in order to find that the area was
predominately white. A macro perspective would have asked: “Why
67. Mandelker, supra note 47, at 1253.
68. Id.
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is this housing proposed for this location?” Although the issue of
“suitable alternative sites” was raised, it never focused on the fair
housing policy implications for the city as a whole. Assuredly, the
restrictive zoning in other parts of the city was making multifamily
federally-assisted housing unavailable in the white part of town,
thereby excluding those minorities over-represented in the group
eligible for the federally-assisted housing. Indeed, the defendants
specifically cited this unavailability of suitable alternative sites as a
justification for building on the challenged site! Other macro issues
were also raised, but not decided, in the context of the tipping issues.
One such issue concerned whether those middle-income, white
homeowners who wanted to sell their property in proximity to Trinity
Gardens and flee the area had any other area to which they could go.
As a result, even in this situation a macro perspective was used to
buttress a micro result.
To the extent that Coffey raised either the desegregation issue or
the “outcomes” or the “ends” perspective it did so in the limited
context of a micro focus. Using a micro perspective the court asked
whether the area around Trinity Gardens would become segregated
rather than whether the city perpetuated segregation by excluding
federally-assisted housing, and the minorities who in disproportionate
numbers would likely occupy it, from other sections of the city.
The analysis so far suggests that some policies—
nondiscrimination, individual rights, process, means, and micro
perspective— tend to be related and correlated, though not
exclusively or completely. Similarly, policies such as desegregation,
group fairness, outcomes, ends, and macro perspective tend to
correlate one with the other. While each policy can have a distinct
emphasis in a particular context, on the whole, they have a tendency
to overlap. Each correlated policy group also tends to point in the
opposite direction from the other group. In this sense they seem to
have oppositional tendencies. I am not trying to suggest, however,
that in every instance each policy in the oppositional group that it is
associated with always stands in opposition to every policy in the
other group. But it does appear that in most cases the oppositionals in
one group tend to point to opposite analyses from the other group.
The following matrix depicts the fair housing policy perspectives
that tend to be correlated and those that tend to be in opposition:
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Matrix of
FAIR HOUSING POLICY CORRELATES AND OPPOSITIONALS
CORRELATES
(vertical)
with
TENDENCY
to be
OPPOSITIONALS
(horizontal)
MAJOR POLICY EMPHASIS IS ON:
NONDISCRIMINATION DESEGREGATION
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS GROUP FAIRNESS
PROCESS OUTCOMES
MEANS ENDS
MICRO MACRO
The matrix does not mean to depict a claim that the policy
perspectives that tend to be oppositional must always be in
opposition. For example, if individuals who assert a right not to be
discriminated against broadly prevailed against discrimination at least
over a substantial time, one would observe desegregation and fairness
for the group previously victimized by the discrimination. Over time
a nondiscriminatory process would inevitably affect the outcome with
the consequence that society would be less segregated when viewed
from a macro perspective. This analysis seems to beg for an answer
to the question of why the apparent conflict exists in fair housing
policy. Why do the policy correlation groups tend to be in
opposition?
2. Ambivalent Answer and Wrong Paradigm
One reason the policy correlation groups tend to be in opposition
is that America has not seriously come to grips with either set of
policy correlates. On the nondiscrimination side of the chart,
Americans still focus on relief for the individual and personal
vindication, even in face of conduct with widespread effects. This
portion of the chart explains why the government under Ronald
Reagan’s Justice Department went after the Starrett City complex for
discrimination, yet otherwise did very little to enforce the Fair
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Housing Act.69 The position taken mirrored the position the Reagan
Administration espoused regarding Title VII employment
discrimination violations–only individualistic relief was available and
it opposed group-based remedies, such as affirmative action.70 This
perhaps explains much, but it does not explain why the NAACP also
opposed the Starrett City methodology.71
In some respects the federal fair housing policy has been to pursue
spatial deconcentration, but the pursuit has not been particularly
vigorous. One reason may be that to do so would have virtually
halted the building of federally-subsidized units. Even the switch to
tenant-based vouchers has not effectively promoted deconcentration.
It would be fair, I think, to suggest that white America is ambivalent
about the solution of housing segregation and that many in the black
and other minority communities do not necessarily favor
deconcentration.72 Blacks ask, “What is wrong with a black area?”
One cannot know the extent to which blacks and other minorities, if
given a real choice, would indeed choose to move from an area
comprised mostly or completely of persons of the same racial or
ethnic group in order to live in an integrated environment.73
Moreover, even if one knew for sure that minorities would prefer to
live in integrated communities, one still could not know all the
reasons behind their preference. For instance, minorities could base
their preference on the integration itself or on attributes that the all-
black or all-minority community did not have but the white or
integrated community might have, such as better schools, better jobs,
better community facilities, greater amenities with better access, and
69. See supra note 29. See also Selmi, supra note 16, at 1440-47 (discussing limited
governmental enforcement and pointing out that private litigation might achieve better results
for clients, at least with larger damage awards in some types of cases).
70. See William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the Reagan Years
(1980-89): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 645 (1994).
See also Brad Lindeman, Diversifying the Work Place: Affirmative Action in the Private Sector
After 1991, 42 S.D. L. REV. 434 (1997).
71. Simon, supra note 43, at 824. See also Arthur v. Starrett City Assocs., 98 F.R.D. 500
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (certifying a class with NAACP attorneys representing plaintiffs).
72. See, e.g., Charles Smith, Racism and Community Planning: Building Equity or
Waiting for Explosions, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61 (1997).
73. See, e.g., Reynolds Farley, Neighborhood Preferences and Aspirations Among Blacks
and Whites, in HOUSING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 161 (G. Thomas Kingsley &
Margery Austin Turner eds., 1993).
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more effective municipal services.74 Assuredly, no evidence exists to
suggest that blacks believe, as the Third Circuit court once opined,
that the “increase or maintenance of racial concentration is prima
facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at variance
with national housing policy.”75
On the tipping problem, both the Starrett City and Coffey courts
rejected the proffers of potential tipping, respectively, as a reason for
permitting the quota on minorities or as a reason for stopping Trinity
Gardens. I am confident that the response among many in the black
community about the prospect that whites might move out or that
whites would not move in to replace those who left would be, “Let
the whites run!”
Therefore, as an abstract ideal, integration is seen as a desirable
goal and a good policy. However, when the chips are down in the real
world, and in a practical context, the integration policy takes a back
seat with both whites and blacks.76 Many whites are probably
ambivalent about the goal in the first place,77 and many blacks would
quickly sacrifice integration to satisfying a housing need in
preference to an abstract notion of fair housing.78 Consequently, the
ultimate conclusion is that America is ambivalent about integration of
housing.79
Given America’s ambivalence, it is understandable that Congress
reflects that same ambivalence. The 1968 Congress that enacted Title
VIII did not contemplate today’s manifestation of the fair housing
74. See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle
Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 973-74 (1997); John A. Powell, Living and Learning: Linking
Housing and Education, 80 MINN. L. REV. 749 (1996); James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the
Kerner Commission’s Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Education, and Social
Integration For Low-Income Blacks?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1519 (1993).
75. Shannon v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3d Cir. 1970).
76. See, e.g., Richard H. Sander, Housing Segregation and Housing Integration: The
Diverging Paths of Urban America, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 977 (1998).
77. This is one aspect of the NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) phenomenon. See generally
Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at its Viability, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 539 (1995); Thompson, supra note 17.
78. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Spatial Equality and The Kerner Commission Report: A
Back-to-the-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1486, 1496-1500 (1993).
79. For example, America is ambivalent about integration of housing just like it is
ambivalent about affirmative action. See Jody David Armour, Hype and Reality in Affirmative
Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1997). See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY
A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993).
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policy choices that have been constructed in this essay. To the extent
that Congress contemplated a policy, it most likely would have been
the nondiscrimination set of correlates. Given the history of racial
animus that characterized the problems of the 1960s, it would have
been natural to focus on the anti-discrimination policy. If there is no
social consensus, even among blacks and progressive whites to work
on the desegregation paradigm, it stands to reason that the Congress
has not and will not clarify the statutes in ways to further the pursuit
of that goal. Similarly, as long as courts do not have the doctrinal
tools needed to focus on the right paradigm to which they are asked
to provide answers, one cannot expect much of them when it comes
to desegregating America.
I have a concern that as long as there are wide economic
disparities between minority groups and whites any goal of fair
housing will continue to be out of reach. Notice that in each of the
cases examined necessity drove in some respect a disproportionate
share of minorities to seek the housing involved. This phenomenon
had to be related to economic deprivations experienced by minorities.
Clearly a class dimension to the phenomenon exists, but that is not
enough.
Economics alone does not account for white opposition to
desegregation of housing when it involves housing near them.80 It is
hard to believe that serious analysts deny that outright bigotry and
disguised bigotry under the guise of property values, crime, cultural
difference, and a host of antagonisms are still potent forces
forestalling desegregation in housing.81 Therefore, any real effort to
promote a housing desegregation policy must have both a social
thrust and an economic thrust.82
The economic thrust would need to include adequate housing
subsidies so that an eligible person’s housing subsidy becomes as
much of an entitlement for the poor as it already is for middle- and
upper-class homeowners. The inadequacy of subsidies for the poor
80. See Marc Seitles, Comment, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in
America: Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies,
14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 89 (1998).
81. See, e.g., Boger, supra note 15, at 1574-81.
82. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 73, at 183-85.
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contained in the HUD housing budget for subsidized housing
contrasts starkly with entitlement subsidies, called “tax
expenditures,” that go to the middle and upper class.83 In Fact, as a
distributive end, that outcome reverses the classical ideas of an
income-redistribution policy.84 It gives to the higher-income groups
rather than redistributing from higher-income groups to lower-
income groups. There are equity questions even within the upper-
income persons who get the entitlement benefit because, in general,
the benefit provided goes disproportionately to those with the highest
incomes,85 and thus, by definition, the least need.
The social thrust must be directed to ending residential
segregation. This thrust would require a mammoth and controversial
undertaking. In the current political climate, I regret that I do not
think it will be undertaken. However, many years ago I formulated
the outline of a plan that I thought then and still think now would
enable us to address the desegregation side of the policy matrix by
working to curtail exclusionary zoning. Of course, the pervasiveness
of the residential segregation patterns probably would require a
multifaceted approach.86
83. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
84. Id.
85. See Peter Dreier, The New Politics of Housing, 63 J. AM. PLAN ASS’N 5, 6-9, 18
(1997), cited in CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 7-12
(3d ed. 1999). Even Congress has long been aware of these issues. See JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 104TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURE FOR FISCAL YEARS
1996-2000 (Comm. Print 1995). This report, prepared for the House Committee on Ways and
Means and the Senate Committee on Finance by the Staff of the Joint Committee, contains data
showing the distribution of the mortgage interest deduction (“tax expenditure”) by income class
for 1996. Id. at 25.
86. For examples of the many proposals that have been advanced see Michelle Adams,
Separate and [Un]Equal: Housing Choice, Mobility, and Equalization in the Federally
Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413 (1996); Margalynne Armstrong,
Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable Remedies to Achieve the Purposes
of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 909 (1991); Boger, supra note 15, at 1580-90;
Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning Law, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1987); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Thinking Regionally About Affordable
Housing and Neighborhood Development, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 577 (1999); Julie M. Solinski,
Affordable Housing Law in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut: Lessons for Other States,
8 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 36 (1998); Peter J. Vodola, Connecticut’s
Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure Law in Practice, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1235 (1997);
Timothy J. Choppin, Note, Breaking the Exclusionary Land Use Regulation Barrier: Policies to
Promote Affordable Housing in the Suburbs, 82 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2062-63 (1994); J. Mark
Powell, Note, Fair Housing in the United States: A Legal Response to Municipal Intransigence,
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III. TOWARDS “ONE AMERICA”: REPRISE OF A LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL
The discussion in this Section is directed to identifying the
statutory provisions needed to correct the legislative inadequacies
with respect to suburban exclusion/inclusion that are found in both
doctrine and remedies. I first made this proposal for a “One America
Act” over twenty years ago.87 In the Appendix, I set forth the
essential text of the proposed statute as the legislative vehicle for
correcting the inadequacies. I have not empirically tested or modeled
the application of the proposed provisions to the facts of any
metropolitan areas or housing market areas; but the general thrust of
the proposal is clear. I attempt to identify the framework in which a
statute such as the one proposed should be considered, the premises
and constraints affecting housing and development policies, and
outline specific problems to which provisions of the proposed statute
address, the elements of an adequate statute and the rationale
underlying particular elements.
Even if Congress enacted a statute such as the one proposed, of
course, it would not cure all the ills of race and class, or even of
housing need, exclusion, and minority status affecting America.
Recognizing the nature of the political process and understanding the
nature of the legislative process, I understand fully that the statute, as
proposed, most likely could not be enacted. Nevertheless, it does, in
the context of the discussion that preceded it, illustrate the
dimensions of the solution needed in light of the magnitude of the
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 279.
87. See Charles E. Daye, The Race, Class and Housing Conundrum: A Rationale and
Proposal for a Legislative Policy of Suburban Inclusion, 9 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 37 (1977). This
part of the discussion is a slightly revised representation of the arguments and the proposal that
I made in that 1977 article. While times have changed the thrust of the proposal still seems
relevant. The thing that may have changed most may be the political horizon and the outlook of
the author. My optimism about the possible future of a desegregation thrust may have
diminished, although in 1977 I was fairly sure the proposed act could not pass political muster.
Now I am virtually certain the proposal could not be enacted because my perception is that the
country has actually grown more conservative. The cycle is overdue for a more liberal
perspective. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY
(1986). Perhaps my perspective has evolved and matured, or perhaps I have just become cynical
about the political climate for corrective social legislation and the judicial climate for using
courts as instruments to effect social justice.
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problems the nation faces.
A. Premises and Constraints
A statute prohibiting suburban exclusion and mandating inclusion
cannot be subordinate to either the tradition of local land use
autonomy88 or the desire for unrestricted freedom of individuals to
associate, at least not when municipal action becomes the vehicle for
effectuating that desire.89 Nevertheless, in recognition of the
importance of these interests the proposed statute subordinates them
only to the limited extent clearly necessary. The proposal does not
directly address segregation within a municipality by the use of
exclusionary devices.90 In that sense one might say that the proposal
would not address the situation involved in the Coffey case. However,
I think that, in part, there were broader reasons underlying the
problem raised in Coffey. Two of these reasons were that minorities
were over-represented in the economic class eligible to live in Trinity
Gardens, and that exclusionary zoning in other parts of the city
contributed to the excessive demand for the proposed site in question.
To the extent that the proposed statute is premised on opening
opportunities for minorities and lower-income classes throughout the
housing market area of the proposed housing, two events would
happen. First, minorities would not be limited to areas within the city
zoned for multifamily housing. Second, families needing subsidized
housing would not be limited to areas within the city. In that sense
the excess demand by minorities for housing such as Trinity Gardens
within the particular area would be lessened. However, the statute
does not address situations in which minorities still prefer to live in a
minority area or in an area with a concentration of assisted housing,
88. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 300-01 (1976).
89. See, e.g., Smith v. Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1063-66 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding a town
liable under the Equal Protection Clause, inter alia, for withdrawing from a joint plan to
construct low-income housing, where its withdrawal was a response to town residents’
opposition that was “motivated in significant part by racial considerations”); Dailey v. Lawton,
425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970) (stating that in a racial discrimination action it is enough
for the complaining parties to show that the local officials are effectuating the discriminatory
designs of private individuals).
90. See, e.g., NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15
(1988).
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even after the opportunity to live elsewhere actually becomes
available. The “pressure-relieving” strategy of making a broader
range of locations available to increase opportunities for eligible
families should work to better address the excess demand for housing
by minorities in either the Starrett City or the Coffey context.
If ending suburban exclusion and mandating suburban inclusion
are to be made an enforceable and meaningful national fair housing
policy, the most adequate remedy would be to require the entire
federal apparatus to further that policy, not merely those federal
agencies dealing with housing. This requirement would mean that, at
least to the extent that funds are involved, every agency should
provide funds only when the funds would be used consistently with,
and in furtherance of, the nation’s fair housing policies. An analogous
provision already included in Title VIII provides that:
All executive departments and agencies shall administer their
programs and activities relating to housing and urban
development (including any Federal agency having regulatory
or supervisory authority over financial institutions) in a manner
affirmatively to further the purposes of this subchapter and
shall cooperate with the Secretary to further such purposes.91
The proposed statute, in substance, would simply delete the italicized,
limiting phrase leaving the duty applicable to all of federal agencies
and all of their “programs and activities.” The prohibition on
exclusionary land use practices should be strong and extensive.92 To
avoid any problem of interpreting the extent of the act’s reach with
respect to these practices, the proposed act makes clear that all the
power Congress possesses under the Constitution is exercised. The
sole issue of determining the extent of the prohibition would be
whether under any provision of the Constitution, Congress has the
power to act. If Congress possesses the power to prohibit the
exclusionary practice in question in any case, the proposed act would
make clear that it is prohibited.
Whether such a limitation would pass constitutional muster before
the present Supreme Court cannot be predicted with confidence.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
92. See Appendix, One America Act, § 4 (proposed) [hereinafter One America Act].
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There are some questions about the extent of permissible conditions
under the Spending Clause of the Constitution.93 Also, there may be
questions of power or conditioning of funds under the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments.94 It must be pointed out, however, that the
federal government is deeply implicated in the creation of the
housing segregation that continues to exist today.95
In addition, to the extent that decent housing in a suitable living
environment is fundamental to the achievement of virtually every
national social policy, in education, employment, economic uplift,
and other affairs, it is not completely unreasonable to argue that
similarly extensive activities of the federal government should be
93. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (setting down in certain
contexts three requirements on imposing conditions under the spending power: that the matter
must be within the concept of the “general welfare,” be unambiguous, and be reasonably related
to the federal interest in a national program); see also Thomas Lundmark, Guns and Commerce
in Dialectical Perspective, 11 BYU J. PUB. L. 183, 203 (1997) (discussing the reach of the
commerce clause through use of the Fourteenth Amendment or the spending power to prohibit
state discrimination). Analyses have also been made in other contexts. See Richard Briffault,
“What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1311 (1994) (arguing that that to pre-empt state authority Congress can
use the spending power or the Fourteenth Amendment); Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against
Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 587 n.89 (1999)
(discussing Religious Liberty Protection Act’s basis on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
enforcement clause, the spending power, and the Commerce Clause); Melanie Hochberg, Note,
Protecting Students Against Peer Sexual Harassment: Congress’s Constitutional Powers to
Pass Title IX, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 268 n.218 (1999) (discussing how Congress could have
used either the Fourteenth Amendment or the spending power to enact Title IX).
There may also be questions about the extent of congressional regulation outside of the
spending context, such as the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct.
1740 (2000) (Commerce Clause did not provide Congress Power to enact the civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (West 2000), because the
activity affected did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
94. See Jones v. Alfred E. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding § 1982 under the
Thirteenth Amendment); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(upholding public accommodations provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the Commerce
Clause). See generally Adams, supra note 86.
95. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 WIS. L. REV.
1395, 1419 (“The extent and severity of such segregation would have been impossible,
however, without the active participation of various levels of government.”). For a fuller
rendition of this theme see James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historical and Legal
Analysis of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 HOW. L.J.
547 (1979); Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and
Legal Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617
(1999).
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devoted to remedying the housing problem.96 The essential argument
is that the federal government should not provide funding to a
governmental body that acts to undermine an objective, non-
exclusionary housing, which is perhaps the lynchpin of school
desegregation, improved job opportunities, and an improved living
environment for minority and lower-income families. All federal
funds, at a minimum, should be conditioned on the governmental
recipient’s forbearance of conduct that undercuts a fundamental
national fair housing policy. Accordingly, all federal funds should be
conditioned on the effectuation of that basic policy.97 Indeed, apart
from national defense concerns, it is difficult to see that there is any
policy the federal government can undertake that is not related to the
achievement of the goal of “a decent home in a suitable living
environment.”98 To the extent that the goal is unrealized, virtually all
other domestic policies cannot be realized fully or at all.
To mandate a policy without providing tools to the agencies and
courts to effectuate that policy would be a hollow, perhaps cruel,
gesture. Accordingly, to be regarded as adequate, a statute would
have to precisely specify its objectives, provide clear commands to
agencies and courts, specify the standards by which to determine its
reach, and provide enforcement tools to most effectively realize its
objectives. The overriding problem the statute would address is
governmental action in the land use area that excludes a
disproportionate number of racial minorities or persons of the lower
economic classes from living within its boundaries. The proposed
statute addresses that specific problem of exclusion.99
The problem involves exclusion as a nationwide concept, but it
appears that a nationwide prohibition would be unworkable.
Therefore, the criteria for determining whether exclusion has
occurred must be referenced to some realistically workable
geographic standard. In an attempt to maximize housing locational
96. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 11 (1975); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 74, at 1552.
97. See One America Act § 5(a).
98. The Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). See also The National Housing
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1999) (reaffirming § 1441); 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1994) (same); 42
U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. II 1990) (same).
99. This term is operationally defined infra.
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choices, but not dictate them, the standard should be tied to general
locational choices the population has already expressed. Thus, the
geographic area in which exclusion is measured should, on the one
hand, be small enough to be workable and, on the other hand, large
enough to effectuate the goal of placing the prohibition on exclusion
in its meaningful context as discussed, for example, by Professor
Mandelker in his Arlington Heights analysis.100 The statute, therefore,
would appropriately define the geographic area as the metropolitan
area or housing market area. However, the definition of these terms
must be workable. Workability would be enhanced if the statute
focused on geographic areas for which data is already generally
available, areas that represent functional geographic units, and areas
that are tied to concepts employed by housing and planning
professionals. 101
Finally, to make a prohibition on exclusion something more than
an empty promise, the means must be made available both locally
and nationally for providing housing that would bring about an end to
exclusion. If, or when, local governmental action fails to achieve its
goal, the national government must be authorized to act to achieve
the national policy. In recognition of deep rooted traditions of local
autonomy in the land use area, the opportunity for local governments
to act should be substantial.102 Therefore, only when local
governments clearly fail should the more intrusive options be
pursued. When events make it clear, however, that without direct
federal action the national policies will fail of achievement, the
federal government’s capacity should equal the need.
100. Mandelker, supra note 47, at 1246.
101. The statute should focus on areas such as “housing market areas.” See Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1976), for a discussion of housing market areas in the
context of a metro-wide housing order directed to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development but noting that since compliance with local zoning would be required no coercion
of suburban jurisdictions would be involved.
102. See Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation
and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1997).
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B. Elements of an Adequate Statute
1. The Policy of Prohibiting Exclusion
The first matter that demands attention is defining the problem to
be addressed: exclusionary land use practices. But what is a land use
practice, and when is it exclusionary? A narrow definition of land use
practice would invite artful or devious devices to avoid the statute.
The proposed statute would prevent evasive strategies by laying
down an encompassing definition of “land use practice.”103 Its
definition includes any “restrictions, regulations or controls” on the
usage of real property and goes on to specify several examples. Then
it contains the inclusive phrase, “any and all qualitatively similar”
kinds of local conduct. Further “land use practice” should be defined
to include any conduct “directly related” to any restriction,
regulation, or control on the usage of real property. The definition
then lists several specific examples such as limitations on residential
construction, limitations on sewer hookups, and concludes with a
catchall phrase covering “qualitatively similar” conduct.104 The
definition should be broad enough to make clear that evasive conduct
will prove unsuccessful. Where evasive conduct exists, courts will
not have to hesitate while guessing at the application of the statute.
Accordingly, the impulses to adopt evasive devices, as well as the
delays incident to extensive litigation, would be minimized under the
proposed statute.
The next step is to define land use practices that constitute the
evils to which the statute is directed. One evil is an “exclusionary”
land use practice.105 A second evil is the failure of local governments
that have practiced exclusion to remedy the consequences of that
conduct. The proposed statute addresses both aspects of the problem.
Exclusionary land use practice should be defined as any practice
which results in or causes the exclusion of a “disproportionate
number of persons of any racial group, ethnic group, or any national
103. See One America Act § 3(a).
104. See id. § 3(a)(2).
105. See, e.g., Janai S. Nelson, Comment, Residential Zoning Regulations and the
Perpetuation of Apartheid, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (1996).
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origin, or income group from residing within the geographic or
political jurisdiction of the local governmental body” engaging in the
land use practice.106 The proposed definition has four features. First,
it is limited to the specific problem of land use exclusionary practices
along racial or economic lines.107 Second, the definition covers
instances in which a governmental body’s capacity to engage in a
land use practice extends beyond its geographic jurisdiction, such as
in an extra-territorial planning district. Thus, the act would include
not merely a local government’s geographic jurisdiction, but also its
“political” jurisdiction.108
Third, the definition contains a provision that incorporates a “fair
share” analysis for determining whether a land use practice is
exclusionary. The provision accomplishes this by defining an
“exclusionary land practice” as one which excludes a
“disproportionate number” of persons of a racial or income group. In
turn, it defines “disproportionate” and “number of persons” by
comparing the ratios of the proportions of persons residing within the
governmental body’s jurisdiction and the persons residing in the
larger geographic or housing market area that includes the
governmental body.109 By way of analogy, the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974110 contained a provision
conditioning federal community development block grants on a local
government’s making an assessment of the housing needs of lower-
income persons residing in or expected to reside in the area of the
local government.111 One court eviscerated the requirement by
106. See One America Act § 3(b). Compare H.R. 3504, 95th Cong. (1977). Section 206(g)
of H.R. 3504 would have amended the 1968 Civil Right Act by adding to § 804, 42 U.S.C. §
3604 (1977), and would have made unlawful the exercise of any governmental powers with
respect to “planning, zoning, subdivision controls, building codes or permits or other matters
affecting land use or development, to exclude low or moderate income housing because of the
eligibility of such housing for governmental assistance, or because of the race, color, national
origin, or economic status of the prospective occupants of such housing.”
107. An argument can be made for addressing other characteristics (such as age, sex,
religion, household status as unmarried female-head). I would not be opposed to that, but
exclusionary zoning on the basis of these characteristics probably is less frequent or in some
respects overlaps the concerns of racial and economic exclusion.
108. See One America Act § 3(b)(1).
109. See id. §§ 3(b)(2), (3).
110. See id. §§ 3(b)(2), (3).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(A) (1977), replaced by Housing and Community Development
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holding that persons and municipalities outside the area of the local
government who were challenging the government’s “expected to
reside” figures had no standing to sue HUD or the allegedly
offending local government with respect to the figures.112 The
specific “expected to reside” requirement was later deleted from the
legislation.113
Fourth, the proposal establishes a presumption of an exclusionary
practice if the ratio of the number of minorities or low-income
persons residing in the governmental area is below a benchmark ratio
of minorities or low-income persons in the larger geographic or
housing market area of which the governmental area is a part.114 The
proposal defines presumptive exclusion as an instance in which there
resides in a municipality a proportion of minorities or poor persons
that is below, by fifty percent or greater, the proportion of minorities
or poor persons who reside in the geographic or housing market area
containing that municipality.115 If the fifty percent benchmark were
deemed too low or too high it could be raised or lowered.116  Raising
the benchmark reduces the stringency of the non-exclusion
requirement, while lowering the benchmark places a more stringent
obligation on the municipality.117
The proposed statute would prohibit an act that has the “effect” of
excluding persons by defining an act as exclusionary if it “results in”
Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 302(b), 95 Stat. 384.
112. Hartford v. Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d. Cir. 1976).
113. See Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 302(b), 95 Stat. 384.
114. See Appendix § 3(b)(3). See also id. § 3(b)(4).
115. For example, the ratio of minorities in the housing market area is twenty percent. The
percentage of minorities residing in the municipality under this formulation must equal at least
ten percent to avoid the determination that a “disproportionate number” of minorities have been
excluded. But note that this is not a “strict liability” provision. The determination that a
disproportionate number has been excluded sets a presumption that triggers other steps.
116. For example, if the benchmark required less than seventy-five percent minority
proportion within a municipality, and the housing market area had twenty percent minorities,
the presumption of exclusion would arise only if the municipality had less than five percent
minorities. The municipality’s five percent would be seventy-five percent below the housing
market area’s ratio of twenty percent.
117. If the benchmark required less than twenty-five percent, for example, if the housing
market area had twenty percent minorities the presumption of exclusion would arise when the
municipality had less than fifteen percent minorities. In this instance, the municipality’s fifteen
percent would be twenty-five percent below the housing market area’s ratio of twenty percent.
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or “causes” exclusion.118 Any requirement that a showing be made of
a “purpose or intent” to discriminate or exclude a person or class of
persons would be unworkable and unrealistic, as Professor
Mandelker pointed out in his discussion of the Arlington Heights
case.119 It would be unworkable because proving purpose or intent is
so difficult that a large portion of instances in which exclusion takes
place could not be proved and, thus, would admit of no remedy. It
would be unrealistic because the purpose or intent with which
exclusionary conduct takes place is irrelevant to the question of
whether exclusion exists. For purposes of the statute, conduct that
may not be motivated by an exclusionary intent would constitute the
evil if it is effective at excluding. Conversely, the statute need not
proscribe conduct wholly ineffective at achieving exclusion for the
simple reason that bad motivation to engage in conduct could injure
no one if the motivation produced no exclusion. As an overall matter
a standard that would necessitate looking for purpose or intent would
simply encourage, indeed invite, artful devices to conceal it. A search
for intent in this area would mire courts in the morass of separating
out good motive from bad motive when motive is irrelevant for
purposes of a statute mandating an inclusionary society.
Consistent with the act’s objective of making the least intrusion
upon private individual rights of association, it would be addressed to
governmental, not private, conduct.120 It would reach, however,
devices in which private persons or entities undertake functions that
are traditionally carried out by governmental bodies. In conjunction
with the proposed statute’s concern with land use practices, however,
it would not reach private entities that carry out traditional
governmental functions that are not included in the definition of
“land use practice.” For example, the operation of schools, fire
departments, and garbage collection services might be regarded as
functions traditionally carried out by governmental bodies. However,
if private entities undertook such activities, these entities would fall
within the definition of “governmental body.” Falling within the
118. See One America Act § 3(b)(1).
119. Mandelker, supra note 47, at 1245-47.
120. To arrive at this conclusion, compare One America Act. § 3(b)(1) with One America
Act § 4.
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definition of “governmental body,” though, would not be within the
statute’s coverage unless the governmental body also engaged in a
“land use practice.” This is so because the definition of land use
practice does not include operation of schools, fire departments, or
garbage collection services.121
Conversely, the statute should cover a private entity that
determined dwelling square footage requirements or issued building
permits because it would be performing a function traditionally
regarded as governmental, and one that is included in the definition
of land use practice. Thus, divestiture of a land use function by a
governmental body and transference of the power, for example, to an
association of homeowners or a private club should not take the
activity out of the act’s coverage. Similarly, the creation by the state
of special sewerage treatment districts should not take those districts
out of the act’s coverage since the provision of sewerage services is
traditionally a governmental function and would be defined as a land
use practice under the act. In this connection, attention should be
called to those provisions of the proposed act referring to a “land use
practice”122 because the basic prohibition speaks of a “land use
practice” and other provisions apply only to governmental bodies that
“engage in” a land use practice.123
While the prohibition on exclusionary land use practices might be
absolute, the ultimate sanction probably should not be absolute. The
difficulty inheres in the impracticability of both devising a sanction
that is absolute and devising a reasonable means for enforcing any
such sanction, short of calling federal troops, which would probably
create a situation worse than the problem of exclusionary zoning.
Moreover, the specter of “forced housing,” as the shibboleth goes, is
probably not worth fueling any more than is minimally required to
effect the purposes of the statute. The premise of the administrative
enforcement provision on non-exclusionary land use practices in the
proposed act124 is that in the vast majority of instances federal
funding would constitute enough of a carrot that using a stick would
121. See id. § 3(a)(1), (2).
122. See id. § 4.
123. See id. §§ 3(b)(1), 5, 6(b), 7(b).
124. See id. § 5.
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not be necessary. At a minimum, since federal funds are pervasive in
the lives of governmental bodies, the potential loss of such funds
would spur a wide measure of desirable conduct.
2. The Policy of Mandating Inclusion
A prohibition of exclusionary land use practices would not
necessarily result in making housing available, or in correcting the
continuing effects of prior exclusionary practices. But, since local
governmental bodies are rarely involved in the direct provision of
housing, the most that can be required of them is that their land use
plans provide for inclusionary housing.125
The absence of inclusionary housing appears to result from two
separate phenomena. The first phenomenon is that local governments
engage in land use actions that exclude persons who have the
financial resources to demand housing in the private housing market.
The second phenomenon is that poor persons, regardless of race, are
excluded if they lack resources to make an effective housing demand
even without exclusion.
With respect to the first phenomenon, a prohibition on exclusion
by land use practices, if effective, would benefit excluded upper
income persons. If the governmental body did not cease its exclusion,
provide remedies for continuing effects of the prior exclusion, and
adopt a plan for including the fair share of excluded persons within
its jurisdiction, it would be ineligible to receive any federal funds.126
With respect to the second phenomenon127 affecting those persons
who could not demand housing on the private market without
financial assistance, a prohibition alone would be of no benefit.128 If
that were the end of the act, it likely would fall far short of its
purpose. To prevent such a frustration of purpose and to effectively
implement and achieve inclusionary objectives in instances when
inclusion is not likely to occur without housing subsidies, the act
125. See One America Act. § 5(c)(2).
126. See id. § 5(c).
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., McDougall, supra note 86, at 641 n.112 (pointing out that without assistance
the beneficiaries of inclusionary zoning might not be lower-income people).
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would make the federal government the “houser of last resort.”129 The
federal government would even make funds available to meet the
housing assistance needs of persons with lower-incomes.130 The
Uniform Relocation Act’s provisions governing residential
displacement by federal agencies or state or local entities using
federal financial assistance, contains a limited aspect of this concept
by providing that funds from the displacing project may be used to
provide replacement housing.131 A provision contained in the House
bill that reported out the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 would have enabled direct HUD action in local areas that
failed to implement housing activities, but it was not enacted.132
However, under the federal government’s Section 8 program the
Secretary of HUD is authorized to act at the local level if local
agencies do not exist or cannot act.133
The funds would be made available for housing assistance within
the area of jurisdiction of the governmental body.134 At that juncture,
in order to maximize the land use prerogatives of local government in
conformity with the purpose of the act, the local governmental body
should be given ample opportunity to employ the funds in any way it
saw fit to meet the needs of the lower-income persons.135 However, if
the local government failed to do so after a reasonable interval, the
federal government should be empowered to make the housing
available consistent with sound planning concepts, but without regard
to the local land use practices of the governmental body.136
129. See One America Act § 8.
130. See id. § 8(a).
131. See Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4626 (1994) (entitled “Housing Replacement by Federal Agency as Last
Resort”).
132. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1279 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4449.
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1988) (“In areas where no public housing agency has
been organized or where the Secretary determines that a public housing agency is unable to
implement the provisions of this section, the Secretary is authorized to enter into such contracts
and to perform the other functions assigned to a public housing agency by this section.”)
(emphasis added).
134. See One America Act § 8(c).
135. See id. § 8(c)(3), (4).
136. See id. §§ 8(c)(5), (6), (7).
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3. The Tools of Policy Enforcement
Present doctrines and legislation are seriously deficient with
respect to enforcement mechanisms. The proposed act would go a
long way toward remedying those deficiencies. In the administration
of its provisions relating to federal financial assistance, the proposed
act would vest power in the Secretary of HUD to determine the
eligibility of a governmental body for federal funds.137 I am not wed
to this agency. If giving these responsibilities to HUD, which has
been criticized on various grounds, is deemed a problem, then some
other agency could be designated, such as the Office of Management
and Budget, or a new agency could be created.
The proposed act would spell out the precise criteria by which the
determination of eligibility for federal funds would be made.
Generally speaking, all local governments are engaged in some kind
of land use practice, as that term would be defined in the proposed
act. The key provision would require a presumption that a land use
practice has resulted in exclusion if the proportion of minorities and
lower-income persons residing in the jurisdiction of a governmental
body is at least fifty percent lower than the ratio of the proportion of
that group in the geographic or housing market area within which the
local government is located.138 In cases where the proportion is no
more than ten percent, or less, below the larger area’s proportion, a
determination of ineligibility would not be made.139 In instances in
which the proportion falls below the larger area’s proportion and
between forty-nine and eleven percent the Secretary would be
required to consider all known and relevant factors bearing on the
exclusion issue, as well as the ratio of proportions and the effects and
tendencies of any land use practices.140 Following a determination of
ineligibility for federal funds, the governmental body could become
eligible by showing that it made provision for a reasonable proportion
of housing for minorities and low-income persons. This showing
could be made if either the state prohibited exclusionary land use
137. See id. § 6(a).
138. See id. § 6(b).
139. See One America Act § 6(b)(2).
140. See id.
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practices,141 or the local government both ceased its exclusionary
housing practices and took effective ameliorative steps.142
The proposed provisions would also encourage states to exercise
greater control over their political jurisdictions since enactment of an
adequate state statute would make every governmental body in the
state eligible for federal financial assistance. This provision would be
similar to the deferral under Title VIII of most fair housing actions to
state or local entities that enact “substantially equivalent” fair
housing laws or ordinances.143 Similarly, a finding of eligibility
would not preclude future federal financial assistance if the local
government took adequate corrective measures. This provision
would, therefore, encourage local governments to correct their
practices.
Finally, by setting out clear criteria for determining eligibility, the
proposed statute would put local governments on notice of what is
required and avoid as far as practicable the risks of differential
treatment and arbitrary determinations by the Secretary.
Simultaneously, the act would make a clear statement of its
inclusionary thrust, thus avoiding the need for a large bureaucracy to
make the eligibility decision.144
A comprehensive act should also be enforceable at the instance of
private persons or governmental entities that are affected by any
violation of the act. In order to avoid severe inadequacies in present
doctrines and legislation, the provisions on private enforcement,
should specify who can sue, as well as the standard for determining
whether exclusion had taken place. Key provisions of the proposed
act address these problems.
The proposed act would permit any person, as well as any
governmental body in which a disproportionate number of persons of
any identifiable group or class covered under the proposed act reside,
to sue in federal district court without meeting any jurisdictional
requirement based on the amount in controversy.145 However,
141. See id. § 6(c)(1) (referring to One America Act § 5(c)).
142. See id. § 6(c).
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f) (1999).
144. See One America Act § 6(b).
145. See id. § 7(a).
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plaintiffs could only bring suit against another local governmental
body if the plaintiffs lived in the same metropolitan or housing
market area as the governmental body. Since the standard for
determining whether exclusion has occurred is referenced to
functional geographic units, suits against local governments should
be similarly limited.
As to determining whether exclusion has taken place, the
proposed act would provide that a prima facie case may be made by a
statistical showing that minorities or low-income persons are under-
represented in the jurisdiction of a governmental body engaging in a
land use practice,146or by showing that the land use practice had
exclusionary tendencies or effects.147 After a prima facie showing, the
burden of proof shifts to the governmental body to rebut the prima
facie case.148 Rebuttal could be shown on the same grounds as an
administrative rebuttal,149 as well as on one additional ground. The
additional ground would permit rebuttal upon a showing that the land
use practice had no effect and no tendency to exclude any specified
group or class.150
Based on two considerations the additional rebuttal ground would
be included in the private action section and not the administrative
conditioning section. First, in using federal funds, the government
may set requirements and conditions which tend to effectuate
national policies. Short of constitutional invalidity, the standards by
which the federal government judges whether national policies are
being effected may be as strict as desired, since the government is not
required to make funds available to local governments unless those
governments clearly pursue national objectives. Second apart from
the conditioning of funds to induce inclusion, the act would be
directed to prohibiting exclusion, but not to mandating inclusion.
Accordingly, in private actions the issue will be whether local land
use practices are exclusionary. By hypothesis, such practices could
not be regarded as exclusionary if they could be shown to have no
146. See id. § 7(b)(1).
147. See id. § 7(b)(2).
148. See id. § 7(c).
149. See One America Act § 7(c)(1).
150. See id.
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effect on exclusion and no tendency to exclude. Ultimately, these
provisions would be based on a finding that as a matter of national
policy a local government should not be required to do more than
avoid exclusionary practices if it is willing to forego all federal
financial assistance. But note that local governments might not be
able to avoid all federally-assisted housing, if they are part of a
metropolitan area or housing market area in which a need for housing
assistance exists.151 However, if a local government could prove that
it did not exclude, it would not be liable under the private remedies
provisions of the proposed act. Also, if the local government did not
receive any federal funds and was not in a metropolitan area or
housing market area in which persons needed housing assistance, it
would have no inclusionary duties under the act. Upon failure of a
local government to rebut a prima facie case of exclusion in a private
action, the court could grant any effective remedy within its statutory
or equitable power152 to end the exclusion and ameliorate its
effects.153
Finally, standing under the act would be expanded to the
minimum required by the constitutional Article III limitation of
jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies.”154 The “injury in fact” and
“benefits” test gloss on the standing question155 would be specified as
any “injury” which is not “completely conjectural” and any “benefit”
which is not “completely speculative.”156 The intent of those
provisions would be to avoid the closing of the courthouse doors
except when the person suing had no interest to be protected under
the act and would derive no benefit from a successful suit. Since the
issues would be narrowed and the determination of those issues
would be made under criteria specified under the act, it would seem
proper to permit a wide range of potential plaintiffs to seek to enforce
the national policies of the act. The reason courts restrict standing
seems at least in part to be to avoid getting into open-ended law suits
151. See One America Act § 8.
152. See id. § 4.
153. See id. § 7(f).
154. U.S. CONST. art. III
155. These are the kinds of problems that plagued the plaintiffs and the court in Hartford v.
Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1976).
156. See One America Act § 7(e). See also id. § 7(a).
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with unclear or indeterminable decisional benchmarks. The act would
avoid any need to be concerned about such possibilities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Legislative action such as the statute proposed, if combined with
thrusts to revitalize America’s central cities, would provide the
vehicle for America to seize the opportunity to become, literally, one
nation. The only thing that would make so bold an effort worth
undertaking is the extremely high stake each of us has in the
unfinished evolution of America from a society that has held out the
promise of being just and decent to a society that keeps that promise.
APPENDIX
The One America Act
Section 1. Congressional Findings. The Congress finds and
declares that:
(a) The Nation faces critical social and economic problems arising
in significant measure from the exclusion of racial and ethnic
minorities and persons of lower income from the opportunity to
exercise choice in selecting where to live and work;
(b) It is in the fundamental interest of the Nation to employ
federal resources to eliminate the exclusion of and to mandate the
inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities and persons of lower income
in order to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for all persons;
(c) The absence of opportunity to exercise choice in selecting
where to live and work has lead to the concentration of racial and
ethnic minorities and persons of lower-income in geographic areas
within cities and other areas and that concentration has created
pressures that have diminished the Nation’s ability to achieve truly
integrated and open living patterns;
(d) Exclusion of racial and ethnic minorities and persons of lower
income denies decent housing, a suitable living environment, and
economic opportunities to such an extent that racial and ethnic
minorities and persons of lower income cannot make their maximum
potential contribution to the Nation’s general welfare and to the
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common good; and
(e) Systematic and sustained action by federal, state, and local
governments is required to eliminate the exclusion of and to mandate
the inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities and persons of lower
income in all communities that engage in land use practices.
Section 2. Purposes. The purposes of this chapter are:
(a) To develop viable communities in which decent housing, a
suitable living environment, and economic opportunities are available
to all persons by prohibiting land use practices that exclude racial and
ethnic minorities and persons of lower income;
(b) To develop truly integrated and open residential living patterns
by mandating inclusionary land use practices as a condition of any
state’s or local government’s receipt and use of federal financial
assistance; and
(c) To more effectively enforce both the non-discrimination and
the desegregation objectives of the Fair Housing Act in mutually
consistent and supportive ways, thereby eliminating instances in
which pursuit of non-discrimination objectives conflict with
desegregation objectives because racial and ethnic minorities and
persons of lower income lack the opportunity to exercise choice in
selecting where to live and work.
Section 3. Definitions –
(a) Land use practice. “Land use practice” includes–
(1) any and all restrictions, regulations, or controls on the usage of
real property, for residential purposes, including zoning, lot size
requirements, dwelling square footage requirements, set-back re-
quirements, density requirements, platting, land use plans, water shed
regulations, subdivision regulations, flood plain regulations,
comprehensive plans, official maps, and any qualitatively similar
acts, rules, regulations, laws, ordinances, programs, plans, or
practices, and
(2) any and all acts, rules, regulations, laws, ordinances, programs,
plans, practices, or activities directly related to any land use
restriction, regulation, or control on the usage of real property, for
residential purposes, including any referendum requirement, limita-
tion on residential construction, limitation on the issuance of building
permits, limitation on sewer or water hookups, limitation on the
provision of any service furnished by a governmental body or with
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the permission of a governmental body, or furnished within the ju-
risdiction of a governmental body by or with the permission of an-
other governmental body or a state, the conditioning of any
permission to build any dwelling unit upon the availability of any
service furnished by or with the permission of a governmental body,
by or with the permission of another governmental body or a state, or
by the builder of any dwelling unit, and any qualitatively similar act,
rule, regulation, law, ordinance, program, plan, practice, or activity.
(b) Exclusionary land use practices–
(1) An “exclusionary land use practice” is any land use practice of
a governmental body which results in, or causes, the exclusion of a
disproportionate number of persons of any racial group, ethnic group,
group of any national origin, or income group from residing within
the geographic or political jurisdiction of that governmental body.
(2) The “number of persons” of any race, ethnic group, national
origin, or income group shall be determined by comparing the ratios
of
(A) the number of persons of that race, ethnic group, national
origin, or income group and the total number of persons residing in
the metropolitan area or housing market area, as applicable, with
(B) the number of persons of that race, ethnic group, national
origin, or income group and the total number of persons residing
within the geographic or political jurisdiction of a governmental
body.
(3) A “disproportionate number of persons” shall be deemed to
have been excluded by any land use practice when the ratio of the
number of persons of any race, ethnic group, national origin, or in-
come group residing within the geographic or political jurisdiction of
a governmental body is below, by fifty percent (50%), or more, the
ratio of such persons residing in the metropolitan area or housing
market area, as applicable, in which that governmental body is
included.
(4) A “proportionate number of persons” shall be deemed to exist
when the ratio of the number of persons of any race, ethnic group,
national origin, or income group residing within the geographic or
political jurisdiction of a governmental body or the number of
dwelling units available for occupancy by such persons equals or is
within ten percent (10%) of equaling the ratio of such persons
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/10
p241+Daye.doc 01/04/01
2000] Whither “Fair” Housing 287
residing in the metropolitan area or housing market area, as applica-
ble, in which that governmental body is included.
(5) “Income group” means persons whose individual income, or
who are members of a household whose income, places a person or
household within either that group of persons whose income equals
or is below the poverty line established by the United States govern-
ment, or that group of persons whose income equals or is less than
eighty percent (80%) of the median income for the metropolitan area,
or housing market area, as applicable, in which that person, or the
household of which that person is a member, resides.
(c) Inclusionary land use plan. An “inclusionary land use plan” is
a plan submitted by a governmental body to, and approved by, the
Secretary.
(d) Federal financial assistance. “Federal financial assistance”
means any monetary assistance provided by the United States
government or any agency thereof to a governmental body for any
governmental activity, plan, or program including all grants, loans,
contracts of insurance or guaranty, matching grants, or funding of any
kind for any governmental purpose or for any proprietary purpose
carried out by a governmental body.
(e) Governmental body. “Governmental body” means the District
of Columbia, any political subdivision of any state, and any entity
which is a public body corporate and politic authorized by a state to
exist or created by a state, and any entity which carries out functions
traditionally carried out by public bodies.
(f) Metropolitan area. A “metropolitan area” is any area defined
as a standard metropolitan statistical area by the Office of
Management and Budget, and any other urbanized area not included
within a standard metropolitan statistical area, which is determined
by the Secretary to be a metropolitan area.
(g) Housing market area. A “housing market area” is any
geographic area (within or outside of a metropolitan area) in which
comparable housing units are in competition based on working,
commuting, and residential patterns, and any area within which
residences and jobs are customarily regarded as within commuting
distances from home to work, as shall be determined by the
Secretary.
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(h) Secretary. The “Secretary” means the Secretary of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
(i) Assisted housing. “Assisted housing” means any dwelling unit
for which federal assistance is provided in whole or in part, or any
person determined to be eligible for assistance for housing purposes,
under any program of the federal government.
Section 4. Exclusionary land use practices prohibited. All
exclusionary land use practices are prohibited to the maximum extent
Congress has the power to do so under any provision, clause, or
amendment of the Constitution.
Section 5. Federal financial assistance prohibited–
(a) No governmental body that is engaged in any land use practice
which receives federal financial assistance shall engage in any
exclusionary land use practice.
(b) Every agency of the United States government is prohibited
from granting any federal financial assistance directly or through any
state to a governmental body which engages in any exclusionary land
use practice, or to any governmental body which is in whole or in
part subject to the jurisdiction of any other governmental body or a
state which engages in any exclusionary land use practice within the
geographic jurisdiction of the governmental body which would be
granted federal financial assistance, except as authorized in
subsection (c) of this section.
(c) No agency of the United States government may provide
federal financial assistance to any governmental body which on
August 22, 1974 was engaged in any exclusionary land use practice,
or which at any time after the effective date of this act has engaged in
any exclusionary land use practice, unless
(1) the governmental body which would be granted federal
financial assistance is located within a state which by statute prohibits
exclusionary land use practices within that state in terms
substantively identical to the terms of this act and which statute
provides remedies to exclusionary land use practices substantively
and procedurally identical to those specified in section 7 of this act,
or
(2) the governmental body which is to receive federal financial
assistance
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(A) has ceased to engage in any exclusionary land use practice, or
in the case of another governmental body or a state, such other
governmental body or state, has ceased to engage in any exclusionary
land use practice within the geographic jurisdiction of the
governmental body which would be granted federal financial
assistance,
(B) has undertaken to remove any continuing effects on any
person of the exclusionary land use practice, and
(c) has submitted an inclusionary land use plan which plan has
been approved by the Secretary.
Section 6. Administrative provisions–
(a) Certifying eligibility for federal financial assistance. The
Secretary shall be responsible for certifying, for purposes of Section
5 of this act, whether a governmental body is eligible to receive
federal financial assistance, and upon request of any agency of the
United States government, shall certify whether the governmental
body is eligible to receive federal financial assistance, and such
certification shall be binding on the requesting agency.
(b) Presumptions and method for certifying eligibility. For the
purpose of making the certification of eligibility under this act–
(1) in the case of a governmental body which is engaged, or on or
after August 22, 1974 has engaged, in any land use practice, or of a
governmental body which is in whole or in part subject to the
jurisdiction of any other governmental body or a state which, within
the geographic jurisdiction of the governmental body, has engaged in
a land use practice, the Secretary shall presume that the governmental
body has engaged in an exclusionary land use practice when a
disproportionate number of persons would be deemed to have been
excluded under section 3(b)(3) based on the most recent data
available to the Secretary at the time the certification is made; or
(2) in the case of a governmental body which has not engaged in a
land use practice at any time specified under subsection (b)(1) of this
section, or in the case of a governmental body from which a
disproportionate number of persons would not be deemed to have
been excluded under section 3(b)(3), but within which a
proportionate number of persons under section 3(b)(4) does not
reside, the Secretary shall make the certification based on the most
recent data available to the Secretary at the time the certification is
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made, provided, that the Secretary shall consider the ratio of the
proportions determined under section 3(b)(3) and shall evaluate any
exclusionary effects of any land use practice engaged in at any time,
the continuing effects of such land use practice, any exclusionary
tendencies of such land use practice, as well as any other relevant
factors of which the Secretary has knowledge.
(c) Rebutting a determination of ineligibility. Any governmental
body determined to be ineligible may rebut such finding by
(1) meeting the provisions of section 5(c) of this act, or
(2) presenting evidence satisfactory to the Secretary that neither it
has engaged in any exclusionary land use practice, nor has any
governmental body or state engaged in any exclusionary land use
practice within its geographic jurisdiction in that in engaging in any
land use practice, provision was made for the number of housing
units which would be occupied by a proportionate number of persons
within its geographic jurisdiction.
(d) Elements of an inclusionary land use plan. The Secretary shall
not approve any land use plan as an inclusionary land use plan unless
the plan makes provisions for the numbers of housing units which
would be occupied by a proportionate number of persons.
Section 7. Remedial provisions–
(a) Private actions authorized. Any person who is a member of a
group or class specified in Section 3(b)(1) of this act, and any
governmental body within the political or geographic jurisdiction of
which reside a number of persons which exceeds a proportionate
number of persons by ten percent (10%) or more, may sue any other
person, any governmental body or any agency of the United States
government to enforce any provision of this act in a U.S. district
court, without regard to the amount in controversy, provided
(1) that in the case of suit brought against a governmental body,
suit may be brought only if the person bringing the suit resides in, or
governmental body bringing the suit is located within, the same
metropolitan area or housing market area, as applicable, as the
governmental body being sued; and
(2) that in the case of suit brought against a person as an official
of a governmental body, suit may be brought only if the person
bringing the suit resides in, or governmental body bringing the suit is
located within, the same metropolitan area or housing market area, as
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/10
p241+Daye.doc 01/04/01
2000] Whither “Fair” Housing 291
applicable, as the governmental body of which the person being sued
is an official.
(b) Prima facie evidence of exclusionary land use practice. A
prima facie case of an exclusionary land use practice may be made
against a governmental body upon proof
(1) that a disproportionate number of persons would be deemed to
have been excluded under section 3(b)(3) of this act; or
(2) that any land use practice engaged in by, or within the
geographic jurisdiction of, a governmental body had either an
exclusionary effect, or a natural tendency to exclude any person who
is a member of a group specified in section 3(b)(1).
(c) Rebutting a prima facie case. A prima facie case of an
exclusionary land use practice may be rebutted only by a showing by
a preponderance of the evidence, with the burden of proof being on
the governmental body against which a prima facie case is made, that
(1) the governmental body clearly satisfies the provisions of
section 5(c)(1) or (2), or section 6(c)(2) of this act; or
(2) the land use practice of the governmental body clearly had no
effect of excluding, and clearly has no tendency, direct or indirect, to
exclude, any person specified in section 3(b)(1) of this act.
(d) Secretary may be made a party. The Secretary may be made a
party
(1) to any action in which there is drawn into question the
Secretary’s compliance with any provision of this act, or
(2) to any action not specified in subsection (1) of this section in
which there is drawn into question any provision of this act, and if
made a party, the Secretary shall provide to the court and to the other
parties to the action any relevant information the Secretary may have
regarding any issue raised under this act.
(e) Standing to sue. In any action in which there exists a case or
controversy under Article III of the Constitution, any person who
suffers injury directly or indirectly so long as the injury is not
completely conjectural, or who would benefit directly or indirectly so
long as the benefit is not completely speculative, shall have standing
to sue to determine whether any governmental body is eligible to
receive federal financial assistance, whether the Secretary is comply-
ing with any provision of this act, or to determine whether any
provision of this act is being violated.
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(f) Judicial remedies. Upon a determination that any provision of
this act has been violated the court shall grant that remedy, so long as
the remedy is within its statutory power under this act or its general
equitable power, which will most effectively result in enforcing the
provisions of this act.
Section 8. Federal government as houser of last resort–
(a) Houser of last resort. To the extent of appropriations, the
federal government, acting through the Secretary, shall be the houser
of last resort, and shall make available housing for any person who
does not live in a decent home in a suitable living environment, as
determined by the Secretary.
(b) Studies and reports. The Secretary shall make appropriate
studies to determine, under criteria to be developed by the Secretary,
the extent to which any person does not live in a decent home in a
suitable living environment, and shall, at least annually, issue a
report, on a state-by-state basis, to the President and the Congress,
which contains the results and findings of such studies, which report
shall contain an evaluation of the extent to which any person is not
living in a decent home in a suitable environment by reason of
(1) any exclusionary land use practice,
(2) the unavailability of sufficient authorizations or appropriations
by the Congress,
(3) any recision, impoundment, or refusal to authorize the
spending of funds appropriated by the Congress, and
(4) any inadequacy in any legislation passed by Congress which
would further the ends of this act.
(c) Studies of and funding to meet housing assistance needs–
(1) The Secretary shall make appropriate studies to determine,
under criteria to be developed by the Secretary, the housing
assistance needs of any person specified in section 3(b) in each
metropolitan area or housing market area, as applicable.
(2) Based upon the studies required under subsection (1) of this
section, but not later than eighteen (18) months after the effective
date of this act, the Secretary shall notify every governmental body
that engages in a land use practice within the metropolitan area or
housing market area, as applicable, to which the study relates of
(A) the housing assistance needs of any person specified in
section 3(b) of this act who resides within that metropolitan area or
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housing market area, as applicable, and the number of assisted
housing units needed, and
(B) the number of assisted housing units available to any person
specified in section 3(b) which are needed in the political or
geographic jurisdiction of the governmental body to which the notice
is sent to bring the number of units occupied by such persons up to an
amount which equals the proportion of such persons who reside in
the metropolitan area or housing market area, as applicable, to which
the study relates.
(3) Any governmental body notified under subsection (c)(2) of
this section, if the number of units stated under subsection (c)(2)(B)
of this section is more than two percent (2%) of the existing housing
units within the political or geographic jurisdiction of that
governmental body, shall be notified that it has ninety (90) days to
prepare an inclusionary land use plan, except that in the Secretary’s
discretion the period may be extended for an additional period not to
exceed ninety (90) days.
(4) Upon receipt and approval of an inclusionary land use plan
under subsection (c)(3) of this section, the Secretary shall, to the
extent of funds authorized and appropriated for housing assistance
under any federal housing program, make available, for the area
within the political or geographic jurisdiction of the governmental
body submitting the plan, funds for housing assistance sufficient to
assist the number of housing units determined under subsection
(c)(2)(B) of this section.
(5) After an interval of at least twelve (12), but not more than
eighteen (18) months, the Secretary shall ascertain whether the
housing units for which funds were made available under subsection
(c)(4) of this section are occupied or available for occupancy, or
subject to construction contracts, and
(A) if such housing units are not occupied or available for
occupancy, but are subject to construction contracts, the Secretary
may extend the period for making units available for occupancy for a
period not to exceed six (6) months beyond eighteen (18) months
from the date housing assistance funds were made available; or
(B) if such housing units are not occupied, available for
occupancy or subject to construction contracts, within twenty-four
(24) months from the date housing assistance funds were made
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available the Secretary shall notify the governmental body for which
funds for housing assistance were made available that the Secretary
may take such action as is authorized under subsection (c)(6) of this
section.
(6) In the case of a governmental body which fails to submit an
inclusionary land use plan under subsection (c)(3) of this section,
after notice under subsection (c)(2), or in the case of any
governmental body notified under subsection (c)(5)(B) of this
section, the Secretary may take such action as is necessary and
appropriate to make the housing units available which were deter-
mined under subsection (c)(2) of this section.
(7) In making units available under subsection (c)(6) of this
section, the Secretary may consider any reasons justifying a failure to
submit an inclusionary land use plan or the delay on the part of the
governmental body in making housing units available and if the
circumstances, as determined by the Secretary, warrant, may provide
a further period to the governmental body to make the housing units
available, but such additional period shall not extend beyond thirty
(30) months from the date funds were first made available under
subsection (c)(4); and in any event at the expiration of a period of
thirty six (36) months, the Secretary shall take such action as is
necessary and appropriate to make housing available under
subsection (c)(6) of this section; and in so doing may disregard any
land use practice of any governmental body, provided that the
Secretary’s actions shall not be inconsistent with sound housing
planning; and provided further that any governmental service shall be
extended to housing made available by the Secretary on the exact
terms and conditions that such service is made available by the gov-
ernmental body to other residential users.
Section 9. The Secretary is authorized to issue rules and
regulations. The Secretary is authorized to issue rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with this act, which are reasonable and
necessary to accomplish the purposes of this act.
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